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Abstract

This study analyzes the role of the Indonesian Constitutional Court as a guardian of democracy
in reinterpreting the ideas of economic democracy. Although economic democracy is well derived
from the mind’s eye of social justice established in Pancasila in the 1945 Constitution, some
economic legislations tend to ignore the idea of economic democracy. Therefore, the Constitutional
Court examined the disputed norms through a constitutional review to maintain constitutional
economic order. Moreover, the “ratio decidendi” served as a basis for some of the Constitutional
Court’s verdicts to maintain the two fundaments of democracy. Apparently, as the guardian of
democracy and not merely the protector of human rights, the Constitutional Court considers the
conceptions of freedom and equality consecutively in its judicial verdicts. In this context, if liberty
and equality are embodied in proportional measures in Indonesian democracy, the general welfare
idealized in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution will be promoted in Indonesian national life.
Keywords: constitutional court, economic democracy, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution

Abstrak

Tulisan ini dibuat untuk mengkaji peran pelindung demokrasi yang dijalankan oleh Mahkamah
Konstitusi Republik Indonesia dalam menafsirkan gagasan demokrasi ekonomi. Meskipun gagasan
demokrasi ekonomi diturunkan secara konsisten dari sila keadilan sosial sebagaimana tercakup
dalam Pancasila ke dalam Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (UUD
1945), beberapa Undang-Undang di bidang ekonomi cenderung mengabaikan gagasan ini. Oleh
karena itu, Mahkamah Konstitusi melakukan pengujian konstitusionalitas norma-norma UndangUndang tersebut untuk memastikan konstitusionalitas tata ekonomi Indoesia. Di samping
itu, sebagaimana dielaborasi oleh Penulis, “ratio decidendi” (pertimbangan hakim) dalam
beberapa putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi menunjukkan digunakannya dua dasar bagi demokrasi
ekonomi. Jelas kiranya, Mahkamah Konstitusi berperan sebagai penjaga demokrasi, bukan
hanya sebagai pelindung hak asasi manusia. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah Konstitusi menjadikan
gagasan kebebasan dan kesetaraan secara bersamaan sebagai pertimbangan dalam putusannya.
Demikian, apabila kedua gagasan tersebut mengejewantah secara proporsional pada demokrasi
Indonesia, kesejahteraan umum sebagaimana dicita-citakan dalam Pembukaan UUD 1945 akan
dapat dimajukan dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara di Indonesia.
Kata kunci: demokrasi ekonomi, mahkamah konstitusi, Pancasila, UUD 1945
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pancasila, as well as its existence as the all-encompassing source of law in the
indonesian legal system, is the indonesian national ideology. ideology, as defined
by Merriam-Webster Dictionary, contains three meanings: “a systematic body of
concepts especially about human life or culture; a manner or the content of thinking
characteristic of an individual, group, or culture; the integrated assertions, theories,
and aims that constitute a socio-political program.”2
Pancasila contains five values in which national beliefs and conceptions are
situated to institutionalize a great civilization. Furthermore, as quoted by Yudi Latief,
Soekarno stated that Pancasila could not be viewed as a dogma that is derived from
two major ideologies in the world.3 Soekarno, one of Indonesia’s founding fathers,
argued
Tidak ada dua bangsa yang cara berjoangnya sama. Tiap-tiap bangsa mempunyai
cara berjoang sendiri, mempunyai karakteristik sendiri. Oleh karena itu pada hakekatnya
bangsa sebagai individu mempunyai keperibadian sendiri. Keperibadian yang terwujud
dalam pelbagai hal, dalam kebudayaannya, dalam perekonomiannya, dalam wataknya
dan lain-lain sebagainya.4 [Two nations would never have the same struggle. Each
nation has its own struggle, its own characteristics. Thus, as an individual, a nation has
its own personalities. These personalities are institutionalized into several matters, in
its culture, its economy, its character, and so forth.]
The above notion indicates that Soekarno absolutely disagreed with Bertrand
Russell who divided all nations in the world into two ideologies: the Declaration of
American Independence and the Communist Manifesto. With regard to this point,
Soekarno mentioned that the historical background of the Indonesian people brought
them into a particular situation in which the particular ideology, Pancasila, grew.5
one of the five values involved in Pancasila is social justice, which has been
acknowledged as the fifth value of indonesian ideology. It has become the spirit for
all efforts related to social and economic development in Indonesia. This value set
its orientation on a fairly organized economic system to achieve the so-called social
welfare. Normatively, the value is extrapolated into at least two aspects in the 1945
Constitution as the Indonesian economic constitution.
First, in the 1945 Constitution, the value mentioned above is derived into economic
democracy in which some principles mentioned in Article 33, paragraph (4) are
involved.6 Those principles, established in the 1945 Constitution after the enactment
of the fourth amendment, complement the single principle mentioned in the original
version of the constitution, “principle of brotherhood.”7 Although the discussion of the
amended article in economic constitution involves some controversies, the socialistic
principle mentioned in Article 33, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution remains.
In addition, the 1945 Constitution qua Indonesian economic constitution requires
the state to control the strategic production sectors. Here, Article 33, paragraph (2)
directs the government to control the production sectors that are important for the
2
Merriam Webster Dictionary, “Ideology,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology,
accessed 31 July 2017.
3
Yudi Latief, Revolusi Pancasila, 1st ed., (Bandung: Mizan Publisher, 2015), p.28.
4
Ibid.
5
Latief, op. cit., p.29.
6
Indonesia (a), The 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia, Art. 33 paragraph (4).
7
Ibid., Art. 33 paragraph (1).
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government and for the livelihood of people at large.8 Likewise, the authority of the
state also works on agrarian elements, as written in Article 33, paragraph (3) of the
1945 Constitution. In this point, as a bezitter, the state rules on the use of land, waters,
and natural resources.9
Another aspect derived from social justice is related to economic rights—a set
of citizen rights to satisfy their economic needs. Unlike the original version, the
amended 1945 Constitution recognized human rights after the second amendment
of the constitution. Ideally, economic rights aim to promote livelihood for all citizens.
At a glance, the 1945 Constitution generally integrates two poles in constitutional
life: (i) the authority attributed to the states and its organs and (ii) human rights
granted to every citizen. In the national economy, this economic constitution has
become an important basis on how the economy should be organized. The pendulum
should be positioned in a proportional angle to maintain economic growth driven by
the government and the citizens. In the end, general welfare was institutionalized into
our national economy.
By contrast, normative approaches cannot be fully implemented in the Indonesian
national life. One major problem in organizing the national economy is in the
legislative products, which can refer to the considerable number of constitutional
reviews conducted by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia. According
to its official website, the Constitutional Court has examined 1,033 lawsuits regarding
constitutional review since the Court was established in 2003.10
Harold Crouch provided the raison d’etre of the Constitutional Court. Prior to the
existence of the Constitutional Court, the constitution-makers realized that “the lack
of authoritative interpretation of the constitution had on several occasions given
rise to political tension.”11 Therefore, the Constitutional Court, besides its other
constitutional authorities, holds the main function in conducting judicial reviews of
the constitutionality of laws. They, of course, cover legislations by which the national
economy is ordered.
Although a constitutional instrument is available to solve problems surrounding
the national economy through a tribunal organized by the Constitutional Court,
studying how the Constitutional Court settled these constitutional conflicts is
important. the writer also raises his scientific opinion on the approach of the Court
to conduct a constitutional review.

II. THE FIFTH VALUE OF PANCASILA: SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. Social Justice as a Part of Ideology
As an ideology, Pancasila, which includes the concept of social justice concept,
can be approached from two main theories: interest theory and strain theory.12 The
8

Ibid., Art. 33 paragraph (2).
Ibid., Art. 33 paragraph (3).
10
Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia, “Rekapitulasi Perkara Pengujian Undang-Undang”,
http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.RekapPUU&menu=5, accessed 22 August
2017.
11
Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), p.
61.
12
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1973),
p.201.
9
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former says that an ideology is regarded as a mask or weapon, while the second one
acknowledges it as a symptom and a remedy. In this context, Pancasila can be viewed
from both points of view.
First, Pancasila, with its social justice, is a weapon to overcome handicaps, such as
poverty among Indonesians caused by Dutch imperialism. To describe the situation
before indonesian independence, tan Malaka confirmed that a chronic conflict existed
between the Dutch-Indies administration and the Indonesian people.13 Similarly, as
mentioned by Crouch, some indonesian political elites “emotionally identified the
1945 Constitution with the Indonesian revolution against colonialism.”14 Therefore,
in harmony with the revolutionary paradigm, Pancasila with its social justice could be
an effective trigger to provoke the people to fight against imperialism and raise their
national dream to have an independent state.
On the other hand, Geertz stated that ideology-making departed from the
situation in which social strains occurred. The social strains originated from insoluble
antinomies. Take the paradox between liberties and political orders as an example.15
to overcome frictions, an ideology would form. geertz, in other words, confirmed that
“ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of social role.”16
In this point, the social strains mentioned in the previous paragraph could refer
to the circumstances prior to the ideology-making process. In the Dutch-Indies legal
system society was divided into three classes: the European, the Far Eastern, and
the inlander. in this system, the European was the first class, the far Eastern was in
second, and the native was at the bottom. the stratification, written in articles 131
and 163 of Indische Staatsregeling, determined the role of each citizen.17
In the Dutch-Indies epoch, the second and the third groups often became involved
in social conflict driven by economic matters, such as their economic gap.18 From a
different point of view, Boediono described that the unfair distribution of wealth in
Dutch-Indies embodied nationalism among the citizens to bring their motherland into
independence instead.19 Regardless of the points of view, as written in Indonesian
history, the social friction in this era was taken into account by the founding fathers
while the ideology-making process was organized to prepare for the independence of
Indonesia.
B. Social Justice: Debates in Indonesian Ideology-making
Ideology-making is one step in preparation for Indonesian independence. The
debates appeared in formal meetings of Dokuritsu Junbi Choosakai (Investigating
Committee of Preparation for Indonesian Independence) established by the Japanese
military administration in Indonesia. The investigating committee was tasked to draft
the Indonesian constitution.
The main issue in ideology-making was related to the ideology itself, a concept of
the state or a staatsidee. Some founding fathers, namely, Mohammad Yamin, Soepomo,
13

Tan Malaka, Naar de Republiek Indonesia, 5th ed., (Jakarta: LPPM Tan Malaka, 2015), p.15.
Crouch, op. cit., p.52.
15
Geertz, op. cit., p. 203.
16
Ibid., p.204.
17
See Netherland-Indies, Indische Staatsregeling, Art. 131 and Art. 163.
18
Gie and Madjid, op. cit., p.35.
19
Boediono, Ekonomi Indonesia: dalam Lintasan Sejarah, 3rd ed., (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 2016), p.58.
14
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and Ir Soekarno, were given the opportunity to state their notions concerning the
proper ideology on which the new state should be founded.
in his speech, Mohammad Yamin initiated five basic principles for indonesian
fundaments in organizing the state: nationalism, humanity, divinity, democracy, and
social welfare. After the speech, Yamin gave the assembly his written draft in which
social justice (keadilan sosial) replaced social welfare (kesejahteraan rakyat).20
One of Yamin’s renowned ideas was human rights. Yamin suggested that the
constitution maker adopt the idea in which human rights is guaranteed. Moreover,
Yamin proposed to the committee that the Declaration of Human Rights and
Independence should be integrated in the Indonesian constitution.21
Soepomo was the second speaker. He cited constitutive aspects of a state, as
determined by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:
(i) a permanent population, (ii) a defined territory, (iii) government, and (iv) capacity
to enter into relations with the other states.22 With respect to the third aspect, the
government, Soepomo reminded that the system on which the government worked
should be based on a staatsidee. In short, in acknowledgment of the early Indonesian
cultural system, Soepomo, as described by Marsillam Simanjuntak, proposed an
integral state in which a benevolent father would lead the people.23 Soepomo did
not include any detail about social justice and any acknowledgment of human rights,
given that the state designed in his normative mind is in unity with its people. In this
point, he assumed that the state is not a Leviathan that exists outside the individual’s
personal freedom.24 thus, no human rights-related conflict would occur between the
state and its people.
From another perspective, Benyamin Fleming Intan stated that “Soepomo’s idea of
integralism maintained that in state and society are inseparable as an organic unity
with the primary emphasis on social obligations rather than individual rights and
liberties.”25 Consequently, no people sovereignty would exist; rather, state sovereignty
would be in place.
as the third speaker, soekarno introduced five basic principles: nationalism,
internationalism or humanity, consensus or democracy, social welfare, and divinity.
soekarno suggested to the assembly a predicate for the five basic principles,
Pancasila.26
It is interesting to elaborate Soekarno’s perspectives on his proposal of national
ideology, as he was an outstanding activist who fought for Indonesian independence.
Even though he articulated a number of human rights in his brilliant defense plea
at the Dutch Colonial Criminal Court in Bandung in 1930, he is one of the founding
fathers who refused to recognize human rights27 given that he, similar to Soepomo,
20

Darji Darmodihardjo, Santiaji Pancasila, 10th ed., (Surabaya: Usaha Nasional, 1991), p.26.
Tempo, Muhammad Yamin: Penggagas Indonesia yang Dihujat dan Dipuja, (Jakarta: Kepustakaan
Populer Gramedia, 2015), p.98.
22
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933. https://www.
ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf, accessed 3 August 2017, Art. 1.
23
Marsillam Simanjuntak, Pandangan Negara Integralistik: Sumber, Unsur, dan Riwayatnya dalam Persiapan UUD 1945, (Jakarta: Pustaka grafiti, 1994), p.92.
24
Ibid., p.93.
25
A. Ahsin Thohari, Hak Konstitusional dalam Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia, (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2016), p.141.
26
Darmodihardjo, op. cit., p. 27.
27
Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dillemas of Indonesia’s New Order,
21
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obviously expected that the state that would be established was an embodiment of
the whole people and that the state and its people would always be united. Thus,
political rights do not need to be granted to the citizens. Moreover, in this context, he
assumed that granting people a set of political rights would negate the essence of the
state itself.28
Despite his notorious proposal regarding human rights, especially political rights,
Soekarno’s larger concern was to build economic democracy and social justice.
Todung Mulya Lubis, who detailed Soekarno’s thoughts, described that “Soekarno’s
constant argument was that the issues of economic democracy and welfare of the
people deserved more attention than the issues of political democracy.”29 However,
Soekarno’s view on human rights did not invite any contradictory position from his
counterparts in the investigating committee. Lubis argued that the absence of serious
debates on human rights could be addressed to the Indonesian independence effort
on which the founding fathers focused.30 In addition, the belief at the time was that
a new state should be a strong entity in which individual freedom liberty could, if
necessary, be temporarily sacrificed.
Although Soekarno’s view was accepted by the committee without any reservation,
Mohammad Hatta expressed anxiety about the minimal substance of the constitution
regarding human rights. Several decades later, Hatta’s note, as presented by Satya
Arinanto, was proven, while the government, with its unlimited and repressive power,
violated the rights of citizens.31
In sum, the above details clearly show why the 1945 Constitution, which was
approved by Dokuritsu Junbi Inkai (Committee of Preparation for Indonesian
Independence) on August 18, 1945, determined social and economic matters relating
to social justice on a larger scale.

III.THE 1945 CONSTITUTION QUA INDONESIAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION
A. Economic Constitution and Democracy
1. Economic Constitution in Conception
an economic constitution, as defined by the European union, is “a part (or set
of parts) in the constitution, which contain(s) the stipulation regarding fundamental
economic rights and pertaining principles of constitution as well as other regulations
on market economy.”32 according to the definition given by Eu in its Policy Papers,
an economic constitution contains, at least, economic rights, economic principles
determined by the constitution, and constitutional regulations on market economy.
Economic rights, the first element of an economic constitution, are based on the
state’s obligation to provide people basic needs. The state, therefore, must work
actively to fulfill these rights. from another perspective, Knut d. asplund et al. showed
1966-1990, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993), p.59.
28
Ibid., p.58.
29
Ibid., p.57.
30
Ibid., p.59.
31
Satya Arinanto, Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Transisi Politik di Indonesia, 3rd ed., (Jakarta: Pusat Studi
Hukum Tata Negara Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia., 2008), p.9.
32
Jimly Asshiddiqie (a), Konstitusi Ekonomi, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), p.64.
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that economic rights should be satisfied to maintain social equality.33
Another element, economic principle, which is constitutionally determined by
the economic constitution, would be derived into economic policies.34 In this point,
whether it is implicitly or explicitly written in the constitution, Sjahrir elaborated
(macro) economic policies into four aspects: fiscal policy, financial policy, balance of
payment policy, and macro price policy.35
How can the constitution constitutionally determine the market economy? To
answer the question, the author should provide two positions as to the role of the
government in intervening in the market. First, the government, idealized by the
supporters of nachtwachterstaat concept, intervenes in the market as a regulator and
a referee. In this context, the government acts passively. Here, the government works
while a problem in the market mechanism exists. This notion is in harmony with the
maxim “the least government is the best government.”36
By contrast, another group proposed the concept of the welfare state in which
the state has a broader area to intervene. Richard E. Wagner (1983, p.4) stated that,
in the welfare state, the government participates actively in the national economy, as
depicted below.
Government acts as a participant in market economy ... to produce in addition
to maintaining the framework of order in which those choices are made. There are
numerous ways in which government makes such choices: it offers educational
opportunities to the members of society; it provides insurance coverage against
unemployment, illness, and flooding; it maintains a system of park for outdoor
recreation, and so on.37
In this part, the economic constitution-makers are given two forms of state
intervention in the market. They can choose one of two options to maintain their
paradigm on economic development. They can also combine the two options into an
integrated economic instrument to run their national economy.
2. Two Bedrocks of Democracy: Equality and Liberty
Prior to an analysis on the conception of equality and liberty conception is given
here, Carl schmitt’s definition of constitution needs to be given. one of his set of
definitions of constitution is forma-formarum, which gives an absolute meaning of
constitution (absoluter verfassungsbegriff).38
In this term, Schmitt depicted that a state is established by its constitution. Again,
he, as cited by Jimly Asshiddiqie, stated that constitution contains three principles:
(i) principe van de staatsvorm; (ii) principe van en uit de staatsvorm; and (iii)
regeringsprincipe.39 in this paper, the writer elaborates the first and second principles.
33
Knut D. Asplund, Suparman Marzuki, and Eko Riyanto, Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia, 1st ed., (Yogyakarta:
Pusat Studi Hak Asasi Manusia Universitas Islam Indonesia Yogyakarta, 2008), p.16.
34
Asshiddiqie (a), op. cit, p.68-69.
35
Sjahrir, Kebijaksanaan Negara: Konsistensi dan Implementasi, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p.11.
36
Miriam Budiardjo, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik, Revised ed., (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama,
2010), p.114.
37
Richard E. Wagner, Public Finance: Revenues and Expenditures in a Democratic Society, (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1983), p.4.
38
Moh. Kusnardi and Harmaily Ibrahim, Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia, Revised ed., (Jakarta: Pusat
Studi Hukum Tata Negara Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 1985), p.68.
39
Jimly Asshiddiqie (b), Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2009), p.102-103.
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First, Schmitt divided constitution according to the form of the state into identiteit
and representatitie. The former, which is similar to democracy, is given for a state
in which no distinction exists between the ruler and the people because the people
are the ruler. The latter, which is related to monarchy, is headed by a representative
of the people, not the people at whole.40 Given that the division is just in a formal
sense, Djokosoetono mentioned that the two forms originated from the idea of
volkssouvereiniteit (people sovereignty).41 In concordance with Djokosoetono,
Kusnardi and Ibrahim proposed that in a democracy, people directly rule themselves,
whereas in a monarchy, people give a mandate to a leader to govern them.42
F. Isjwara provided his views from another perspective. He grouped states into
three concepts: (i) state that originated from an abstract idea; (ii) state that originated
from an empirical idea; and (iii) state in which both ideas mentioned before are
synthesized. the first concept is based upon divinity. in this concept, the state is
created by God. This concept gave birth to a theocratic state.43
Then, Isjwara explored the empirical idea mentioned in the second concept of
state and determined that people is an empirical aspect. Therefore, he stated that the
democratic state originated from this concept.44
Third, outside both groups, the state can also be established by synthesizing the
two concepts. In this term, this type institutionalizes the abstract and the empirical
notions into one integrated concept. Isjwara mentioned that the corporative state,
which is established through this synthesis, is based on an immanent idea (Goddelijke
orde). Evidently, this type of state has two fundaments: divinity and democracy.45
The latter aspect is derived into the substance of the 1945 Constitution. In Article
1, paragraph (2), sovereignty is handed by the people. In other words, the Republic of
Indonesia is established on the people’s sovereignty or democracy.
Then, after being formed upon either identiteit or representatie, the entity would
organize itself through material principles of state. djokosoetono clarified that this
kind of principle contains vrijheid (freedom, liberty) and gelijkheid (equality, egality),
which determine the material aspect of a state.46 In other words, both of them exist in
all aspects of a state.
Furthermore, Hans Kelsen stated that “the idea of democracy is a synthesis of the
ideas of freedom and equality.”47 Kelsen determined that freedom would be more
important than equality if there was a disharmony between them, arguing that “this
metamorphosis of the idea of freedom is of the greatest importance for all our political
thinking.”48 By contrast, Aristotle proposed that equality is more essential than its
counterpart. Aristotle, as cited from Djokosoetono, obviously based his position on
the argument that democracy, in implementation, requires equality in liberty, not
liberty in equality. 49
40

Ibid., p.103
Djokosoetono (a), op. cit., p.216.
42
Kusnardi and Ibrahim, op. cit., p.68.
43
F. Isjwara, Pengantar Ilmu Politik, Fifth ed., (sl: Penerbit Binacipta, 1974), p.81.
44
Ibid., p.82.
45
Ibid.
46
Djokosoetono (a), op. cit., p.219-220.
47
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), p.287
48
Djokosoetono (a), op. cit., p.220.
49
Ibid.p.221.
41
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Although those criteria should be institutionalized into a democratic life, the author
strongly agrees with Aristotle and his idea of the supremacy of equality because of
a few reasons. First, as cited from Mubyarto, equality can be an essential approach
to solve the in-time economic issue in Indonesia, which is economic gap among
citizens.50 Second, as a further explanation, the government should institutionalize
equality prior to liberty because, without any equalized adjustment, not every citizen
can enjoy economic liberty.
B. Economic Constitution in Indonesia
An important detail to notice is that the constitution that is being analyzed is the
1945 Constitution after the amendment in 2002. Although the Indonesian founding
fathers’ notion about Indonesian ideology still exists, Pancasila was reinterpreted to
properly respond to the current circumstances in national life.
To identify the Indonesian economic constitution, Jimly Ashiddiqie provided two
approaches. On the one hand, as stated by Asshiddiqie, if the economic constitution
was merely identified by the existence of constitutional economic policy, the 1945
Constitution would be defined as an economic constitution in a narrower sense. on
the other hand, with its determination on constitutional economic policy, economic
rights, property rights, public finance, and Central Bank taken into consideration, the
1945 Constitution could also be defined as an economic constitution in a broader
sense.51 obviously, both approaches defined the 1945 Constitution as an economic
constitution.
However, in this paper, the writer analyzes at least two substances regarding
constitutionally economic policy and economic rights to specifically focus on equality
and liberty ideas as the two fundaments of economic democracy. the first substance,
of course, refers to Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution.
According to the Article, two constitutionally important things exist in conducting
national economy. First, economic development is based on the principles of economic
democracy. The principles, as set out by Sri Edi Swasono in Asshiddiqie (2013, p.
140), was originally laid on the “brotherhood” value and integrated with amended
principles after the fourth amendment of the 1945 Constitution. In the context of
those added principles, Asshiddiqie stated that the economic democracy principles
contained in article 33, paragraph (4) refine the principle of “brotherhood,” which
was originally established in August 18, 1945.52 In addition, to ensure the collectivism
in Article 33, paragraphs (1) and (4), the government has the authority to control the
strategic production process and agrarian elements.
Second, from another side, the concept of liberty bears a set of economic rights
given to all citizens. In this context, as an economic constitution, the 1945 Constitution
attributes people with economic rights protection. Denny Indrayana said that the
economic rights were added to the constitution after Majelis Permusyawaratan
Rakyat (MPR – the erstee kamer) established the second amendment of the 1945
Constitution.53
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However, the rights detailed by the constitution are not absolute rights.
Constitutionally, these rights are regulated by Article, 28J paragraph (2), in which
limitations for the fulfillment of human rights are determined. in detail, the limitations
are deemed by laws for the purpose of protection and respect for others’ rights and
freedoms. This article also takes into account some aspects: morality, religious values,
public security, and public order in a democratic society. 54
Theoretically, the limitation does not mean violence against human rights. It is
applied as to ensure that other citizens’ rights are well protected. Again, the limitation
that appears in law enforcement regarding human rights is still in line with academic
accounts. Conceptually, Friedrich A. Hayek described that freedom of economic
activity, on which economic rights are contextually based, means freedom under the
law.55 In this point, he also sharpened his analysis by arguing that government action
is allowed to participate in the economic field.56
In the Indonesian context, as determined by Article 33, paragraph (2) of the 1945
Constitution, the government participates by occupying the strategic production
sectors that are important for the livelihood of the people at large.57 State-owned
enterprises are given legal apparel to produce and distribute some public goods
to all citizens to meet their basic economic needs. Consequently, welfare idealized
by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is not merely individual welfare, but social
welfare.
C. Economic Democracy a la Indonesia
Djokosoetono proposed two concepts of democracy: (i) as a form of a state and
(ii) as an ideal. The dichotomies between two concepts are related to tempus required
to institutionalize the concept. If democracy is merely a form of state, then it will be
captured in the short term. For instance, general election is directed. 58
However, as an ideal, democracy seems like a never-ending process. To simply
describe this perspective, Djokosoetono referred to the embodiment of economic
and social democracy. Unlike the political one, economic democracy has not been
institutionalized in time.59 Asshiddiqie reminded us that democracy can be seen from
several concrete aspects: political, economic, social, and (maybe) cultural.60
In economic democracy, Hatta delivered his statesman’s perspective that the
Indonesian economic basis is collectivism. Further, he associated collectivism with
the Indonesian concept of tolong-menolong (gotong royong).61 To provide a basis
for Hatta’s conception, Djokosoetono supplied a conceptual distinction between
in Transition, (Jakarta: Kompas Book Publisher, 2008), p.217.
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solidarismus (gotong royong) and mutualismus (tolong-menolong). Although both
concepts are related to working together for one specific purpose, they can differ
from each other through this approach.62
1. Public or private interest. Djokosoetono determined that solidarismus is performed
in the public interest area, while mutualismus is in the private interest scope. For
instance, solidarismus is depicted by people working together to build a bridge. In
the other side, mutualismus depicts people who are working together to build a
neighbor’s house.
2. Expected returns. No returns are expected by everyone who are involved in
solidarismus. Everyone realizes that his contributions in this pattern are to
fulfill collective needs in which his personal needs are contained. By contrast, in
mutualismus, everyone expects social returns from other members of his society
who are receiving help.
Since Hatta laid down both conceptions, solidarismus and mutualismus in the
concept of Indonesian-characterized collectivism, economic democracy has a clear
approach in which they are applied at the same time. However, from another angle,
democracy is built from the notions of equality and liberty. In the Indonesian context,
equality originates from the fifth value of Pancasila, while liberty is based on the
second value.
Finally, what objective should be achieved by performing the approach? The
objective is social justice. Regardless of word choice to concretize social justice in
the 1945 Constitution, such as general welfare (kesejahteraan umum) and wealth
of people (kemakmuran rakyat), the 1945 Constitution still determines that social
justice is the objective.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: MAINTAINING CONSTITUTIONALLY ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES
A. The Roles of the Constitutional Court
As the background of the establishment of Constitutional Court, the writer should
adopt Saldi Isra’s conviction. Isra laid down his assumption on the lawmaking process
in parliament. Although the checks and balances mechanism in legislative bodies
has been internally developed through the implementation of bicameralism, Jeremy
Waldron, as cited by Saldi Isra, still acknowledged that legislatures’ political interests
bring them into some handicap relating to their established legislations.63
To maintain the legitimacy of the laws produced by the legislative bodies, judicial
review, as well as constitutional review, had been introduced.64 Therefore, Laica
Marzuki, as quoted by Isra, raised his view that the legislative body is no longer
the only state organ performing a legislative function given the existence of the
Constitutional Court.65
The Constitutional Court is a state organ that was established by Article 24C
of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Constitutionally, the Court
62
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conducts dispute settlements regarding (i) constitutional review on legislations,
(ii) constitutional authority dispute between state institutions, (iii) the dissolution
of political party, (iv) dispute regarding the result of general election, and (v)
constitutional violation committed by the president and/or vice president.66
From a theoretical basis, the Constitutional Court performs four essential
functions. First, the Constitutional Court is the guardian of constitution. It, of course,
can be referred to its constitutional authority in conducting constitutional review
on legislations. This function originates from the legal—especially constitutional—
construction conducted by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve Marbury vs. Madison in
1803.67 s.B. Prakash and John C. Yoo also confirmed that the landmark decision was
the precedent of judicial review practice.68
Hans Kelsen argued that, unlike law-applying organs, which are able to investigate
the constitutionality of a law only for a concrete case and refuse its application
when recognized as unconstitutional, the constitutional review performed by the
Constitutional Court may be attributed to invalidate the unconstitutional law.69
In other words, the Constitutional Court runs the legislative function as a negative
legislator.
Consequently, the first function served by the Constitutional Court gives birth to
the second function: the final interpreter of the constitution. asshiddiqie argued that
judges are allowed to interpret constitutional norms. The interpretation served by
the judges is an approach to amend the substance of the constitution.70 This function
strengthens the Court’s performance in guiding the constitution in every part of
national life.
The Constitutional Court serves as the guardian of the process of democratization,
which is its third function.71 This function is performed on both political and economic
democracy. According to the two bases of democracy, the Constitutional Court
maintains the balance between equality and liberty.
Lastly, Asshiddiqie noted that the Court also protects human rights. This
function is served by the Court since the human rights became a section in the 1945
Constitution.72 It means that human rights, or constitutional rights, are a substance
guarded by the Court.
B. Constitutional Court’s Vital Role in Maintaining Economic Democracy
Asshiddiqie stated that many legislations have been enacted on economic matters.
However, he also admitted that the material aspect of some legislation does not reflect
the substance of Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution in which economic democracy is
alive.73 This idea means that constitutional norms are only formally considered by the
66
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legislators in the lawmaking process.
In the Indonesian legal system, constitutional norms are derived into general
norms enacted by the legislative body. In this context, with respect to its function as a
guardian of constitution, the Constitutional Court has the authority to ensure that the
constitutional norms are formally and materially deduced in legislations. Therefore,
the Court is given the authority to determine whether the legislation is constitutional
or unconstitutional.
The Court has nine constitutional court justices who are constitutionally appointed
by three institutions: the president, the House, and the Supreme Court. Each of these
state organs independently appoints three justices.74 Thus, the Constitutional Court
reflects the whole spirit of each branch of power.
Asshiddiqie delineated that the Court has convicted a great number of
constitutional reviews in which the Court decided whether a certain piece of
legislation was constitutional or unconstitutional. If it was unconstitutional, then
the Court would declare that the legislation is no longer valid.75 From a narrow
perspective, Asshiddiqie provided information that most constitutional reviews are
conducted to settle material aspects of legislations.76 This situation indicates that
the major problem in lawmaking is not in the lawmaking procedure, but in deriving
constitutional norms into legislative products.
scientifically, the constitutional adjudication conducted by the Court does not
merely change or invalidate the investigated law, but also the substance of the current
constitution. Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh proposed that, in some constitutional cases,
the Court should interpret the constitution to have a fundamentally legal reasoning
in resolving the constitutional dispute. In this sense, the judges should use their
knowledge and wisdom learned in jurisprudence, which are not syncretized with
other perspectives and interests.77
From another reference, Brown and Waller postulated their view on the experience
of judicial interpretation on the constitution. they confirmed that the existence of the
constitutional court is a state organ that makes a judgment in which legal dissension
rests in part on how the constitution should be interpreted and implemented.78
For instance, in Decision Number 036/PUU-X/2012, the Constitutional Court
intervened in the regulatory domain in the oil and gas sector, which was previously
determined by the House and the president through Laws Number 22 of 2001 on Oil
and Gas. At the end of the adjudication process, the Court invalidated some articles
that were deemed unconstitutional given that they did not institutionalize economic
democracy.79 This 2012 Judicial Judgment is one of the outstanding decisions made by
the Court because it introduced a comprehensive understanding on how to organize
the national economy without ignoring the establishment of social justice. As an
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important resource, oil and gas should bring benefits—commercial gains included—
for people as a whole.
Consistently, in their considerations (ratio decidendi), the constitutional judges
used the definition that were previously introduced through Judgment number 002/
PUU-I/2003 regarding the scope of so-called hak menguasai negara, a domain of
economics in which the government can intervene. In this point, to provide a strong
basis on which the economic democracy stands, the Court defined that hak menguasai
negara comprises (i) policymaking (beleid); (ii) lawmaking (regelendaad); (iii)
administration (bestuursdaad), which includes an authority to issue a license to exploit
natural resources included; (iv) management (beheersdaad); and (v) supervision
(toezichthoudensdaad).80This part states that the function of the Constitutional Court
is not only to examine the legislative norms, but also to interpret or reinterpret the
material contents of the Constitution.
Furthermore, in Decision Number 85/PUU-XI/2013, the Constitutional Court
annulled Law Number 7 in 2004 on Water Resources due to its unconstitutionality. In its
legal reasoning, the Court introduced the new approach to understand the Indonesian
economic democracy as a democracy that is in accordance with collectivism, not
individualistic and liberal thought. Explicitly, the Court ascertained that the rise of
private ownership of water resources could harm the national economy, which is
established based on economic democracy.81
In my opinion, this rationale described how the Court realizes that Indonesian
economic constitution is based on collectivism. At the same time, a number of laws
introduce and adopt individualistic values of public goods, i.e., this Law on Water
Resources. These individualistic legislations tend to intrude on the effort to constitute
social justice for all people.
To clarify the issue between collectivism and individualism, Hatta’s proposal in the
constitution-making process needs to be mentioned:
Proses individualisasi akan berjalan terus sebagai antitesis terhadap kolektivisme.
Tetapi cita-cita sosialisme Indonesia mau mempertahankan jiwa kolektif itu sebagai sendi
bangunannya. Jalan kesitu ialah membelokkan individualisme yang mulai berkembang
itu dengan organisasi dan pendidikan sosial. Bukan kembali kepada kolektivisme yang
tua masyarakat diajak, melainkan mendudukkan cita-cita kolektivisme itu pada tingkat
yang lebih tinggi dan modern, yang lebih efektif dari individualisme.82 [As an antithesis
of collectivism, individualization will never halt the process. However, Indonesian
socialist ideals would defend its collective character as its basis. This effort should be
performed by introducing social organization and education. It is not proper to ask
people to institutionalize the old collectivism, but we have to bring Indonesians to a
higher and more modernized collectivism, which is much more effective than its rival,
individualism.]
Hatta’s proposal could be a stepping stone for the Indonesian Constitutional
Court to renew the paradigm of collectivism itself. This idea means that Indonesian
collectivism should be reinterpreted. Here, this reinterpretation maintains people’s
access to water resources.
80
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On the one hand, to give private parties space to participate in the national
economy, the Constitutional Court stated that private parties can still organize their
business in production sectors determined by Article 33, paragraph (2) of the 1945
Constitution inasmuch as the so-called hak menguasai negara is well implemented
to establish social justice for all citizens.83 Apparently, according to the exposition
relating to the content of the 2012 judgment, aside from the issue of economic rights,
which contextually stands on liberty constitution, the Constitutional Court takes
equality into consideration. All in all, this approach is conducted to achieve the socalled social justice.
On the other hand, the Indonesian Constitutional Court did not ignore the
embodiment of the liberty principle at all. First, the Court determined the protection
of citizen’s rights to property. In Decision Number 34/PUU-IX/2011, the constitutional
justices stated that Article 4, paragraph (3) of Law Number 41 in 1999 on Forestry
was conditionally constitutional due to its restriction of the rights on land possessed
by citizens prior to the establishment of this decision. Here, the judges extended the
meaning of the rights of land protection in accordance with constitutional norms,
especially the rights to property as recognized by Article 28H, paragraph (4). As a
result, the scope of protection covers not only the adat communities’ rights of land, but
also particular ones.84 Thus, the government cannot issue land use rights arbitrarily.
From this exposition, the author could take into account that the Constitutional Court
also institutionalizes another bedrock of democracy, namely, freedom.
However, the author should also provide another constitutional review of that
forestry law. In the following year, the Court issued Decision Number 35/PUU-X/2012.
In this decision, the Court attached the consideration on equality to protect adat
communities’ rights to take advantage of forest management.85 Generally, the Court
addressed their consideration that freedom ought to be restricted by the laws86 to
maintain equality among people. Therefore, despite the embodiment of freedom,
according to those five decisions, the indonesian Constitutional Court also contextually
makes the interrelation between liberty and equality in national economic democracy.
Furthermore, to examine the social justice maintained by the Court through
the constitutional review, it is important to mainly provide John Rawls’ proposal on
theory of justice. Rawls assumed the original position; in his conception, everyone’s
original position can be different—unequal—from that of others.87
In respect of the recognition of so-called inequality, Jean Jacques Rousseau
determined the origin of the inequality of mankind. As written in his masterpiece,
Rousseau propounded an idea in which two kinds of inequality were classified. first,
he referred to natural or physical inequality, such as difference of age and distinction of
rational thinking.88 Second, he pointed out moral or political inequality. For example,
inequality appears in political life in which men who possess several privileges enjoy
the prejudice of others, such as being more honored.89
Further, in his principles of justice, Rawls once noted that “social and economic
83
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inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to
everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” it has
an institutional relation with the first statement that in social and economic life,
inequalities exist. Thus, to obtain justice, inequalities should be addressed.90
franz Magnis-suseno delivered a contextual view in which conflict between
freedom and equality occurred.91 In this point, Magnis-Suseno stated that absolute
liberty would bring about inequality. It is obviously clear to supply a response on why
liberalism causes economic gap among the social classes. However, if equality was
fully forced, then liberty would consequently disappear because, especially in social
and economic circumstances, individuals are born in inequality. In this way, the state
should intervene in the natural aspect of people with regard to their distinct original
position with each other.
In the pluralistic Indonesian society in which imbalanced wealth distributions
take place, an important detail to keep in mind is that freedom and equality should
be in a balanced system to not only maintain the constitutionality of laws produced
by lawmakers, but also to minimize the drawbacks of economic inequality related to
further social conflicts. in other words, the fulfillment of everyone’s rights should be
considered with respect to others’ rights and addressed to equality enable to ensure
proper wealth distribution.
The fourth function of the Constitutional Court—that is, as a protector of human
rights—means that the Court should protect citizens’ economic rights. The Indonesian
Constitutional Court should protect civil and political rights as well, as a set of human
rights in a wider sense. As determined by Pan Mohamad Faiz, the Constitutional Court
has contributed to the protection of human rights significantly.92
Nevertheless, the Court should also think of its second function as a guardian of
democracy. As elaborated above, democracy has two bedrocks: liberty and equality.
Thus, the Court must focus on both ideas. However, in Indonesia, due to economic gaps
between the poor and rich social groups, the Court should prioritize the embodiment
of equality instead of the institutionalization of liberty to prevent the “overuse” of
citizens’ rights, which brings about inequality among citizens.
Finally, the Constitutional Court should pay attention to those bedrocks to
give birth to a good economic democracy. The involvement of the two fundaments
of democracy would catalyze the integrative thought of democracy into the Court’s
ratio decidendi by which horizontal conflict could be prevented. this approach helps
achieve general welfare as idealized by the Indonesian people.

V. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the above discussion, I would like to provide the following three
conclusions:
1. The discussion on ideology-making began in preparation for Indonesia’s
independence. This session was held by an investigating committee whose task
was to explore filosofische grondslag on which Indonesia stands, established by
90
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the Japanese military administration. In the discussion, Soepomo, Mohammad
Yamin, and Soekarno gave their speeches in front of the committee members.
In the discussion, most members, whether they were integral state supporters or
not, ignored the urgency of adding the recognition of human rights to the 1945
Constitution. The absence of debate regarding human rights opened a large
boulevard to construct the Indonesian ideology, Pancasila, regarding its fifth value,
social justice.
2. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is an economic constitution, as
it contains some substances regarding constitutional economic policy, economic
rights, property rights, public finance, and the Central Bank. all spheres determined
by the constitution aim to achieve Indonesia’s national desire: to promote the
general welfare.
The spirit of economic democracy is present in the 1945 Constitution. Like political
economy, the economic democracy stands upon two fundaments: liberty and
equality. The former attributes human rights to citizens, and the latter authorizes
the government to intervene in the economic sphere to establish equality and
institutionalize social justice. Both fundaments should be internalized into all
aspects of national economic life to maintain the balance of the Indonesian
national economy.
3. According to the previously mentioned explanation, the Constitutional Court has
made judgments regarding the Indonesian national economy. On this point, the
Court has taken the social justice aspect into account as constructed in the ratio
decidendi.
Given that the Constitutional Court serves as a guardian of democracy, in this
context, it should consider the application of two contents in economic democracy:
liberty and equality. it can be said that if the Court involved only the first content in its
judges’ arguments in decision-making, then only partial democracy is implemented
in Indonesia. However, due to the Indonesian economic democracy mentioned in
the 1945 Constitution, the Constitutional Court has confirmed that equality is more
important than freedom. The equality in economic circumstances here is in line with
the notion of collectivism.
Therefore, the Court should proportionally apply both concepts to institutionalize
the fully democratic state of the Republic of Indonesia. In the long run, all constitutional
disputes can be canalized into a credible constitutional tribunal to prevent a
complicated horizontal conflict in which some social classes become involved. this
idea means that the Constitutional Court’s role is an integral part in institutionalizing
general welfare for all people.
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